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JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTRUCTION OF WASHINGTON'S LAW
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: GRIFFIN V. ELLER AND
MARQUIS V. CITY OF SPOKANE
Michael Spiro
Abstract: Washington's Law Against Discrimination is a broad remedial statute, granting
both a general civil right to be free from discrimination and prohibiting certain specific
"unfair practices." Although no person may be prevented from bringing a cause of action to
enforce his or her civil rights, the remedies available for unfair practices are more limited.
The Washington State Human Rights Commission ("Commission") recognized this statutory
distinction, interpreting the Law Against Discrimination ("Act") to grant independent
contractors the right to bring a cause of action for violations of their civil rights and to
confine the statute's small employer exemption to its own administrative jurisdiction.
Generally, Washington courts accord substantial deference to the Commission's statutory
constructions. However, in Griffin v. Eller, the Washington Supreme Court inexplicably
ignored established rules of judicial deference and invalidated the Commission's
interpretation of the small employer exemption, thus preventing all persons who work for
small employers from enforcing their civil rights. In contrast, the court in Marquis v. City of
Spokane carefully followed these rules in correctly deferring to the Commission's
interpretation granting independent contractors the right to sue. This Note criticizes the
Griffin decision both for compromising the authority of a necessary and vital administrative
agency and for frustrating the purpose of the statute. Moreover, this Note argues that courts
should defer to the Human Rights Commission's construction of the Act when that
construction is reasonably consistent with legislative intent and is necessary for furthering
the purposes of the statute.

Washington's Law Against Discrimination' ("Act") is a broad
remedial statute enacted for the purpose of eliminating and preventing
discrimination in various prescribed areas against certain protected
groups of Washington inhabitants. It grants both a general civil right to
be free from such discrimination enforceable through private causes of
action and proscribes a number of discriminatory "unfair practices"
subject to both private civil and administrative remedies. In addition, the
Act created the Washington State Human Rights Commission
("Commission") with broad rule-making and policy-formulation
powers. Washington courts in general give great weight to the
Commission's interpretations of the Law Against Discrimination when
those interpretations are found to further the policies and purposes of the
Act and to be reasonably consistent with the intent of the Legislature.
Such deference is due primarily to the Commission's broad powers and
authority and its expertise and experience in administering the Act.
1. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 49.60 (1996).
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A recent Washington Supreme Court decision, however, has brought
into question this practice of judicial deference to the Human Rights
Commission's constructions of the Law Against Discrimination. In
Griffin v. Eller2 the court inexplicably ignored established rules of
judicial deference in refusing to give any deference to the Commission,
which had correctly interpreted the Act's definition of employer to
exempt those employers with fewer than eight employees from only the
jurisdiction of the Commission. The Griffin court instead misinterpreted
the Act to exempt these employers from all statutory remedies. In so
ruling, the court not only compromised the authority of a vital and
necessary administrative agency but also wrongly interpreted the Act in
a manner wholly contrary to its statutory purpose. In contrast, the court
in Marquis v. City of Spokane,3 decided the same lay as Griffin,
properly followed these rules by correctly deferring to the: Commission's
interpretation of the Law Against Discrimination when it granted
independent contractors the right to bring a cause of action for violations
of their civil rights.
This Note argues that the Griffin court was wrong not to defer to the
Human Rights Commission's construction of the Law Against
Discrimination. Part I details the Act and its legislative history. Part II
discusses the principles behind judicial deference to administrative
construction in general, Washington's approach in particular, and how
the Washington courts have treated administrative construction of the
Act in the past. Part Ill reviews the Griffin and Marquis decisions.
Finally, Part IV criticizes Griffin and argues that the court should
continue to follow the established rules of judicial deference and give
substantial deference to the Commission's construction of the Law
Against Discrimination, as long as that construction is reasonably
consistent with legislative intent and is necessary to further the policies
and purposes of the Act.
I.

WASHINGTON'S LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

A.

The Act

Washington's Law Against Discrimination4 is a broad remedial
statute, the purpose of which is to eliminate and prevent discrimination
against Washington inhabitants on the basis of race, creed, color,
2. 130 Wash. 2d 58, 922 P.2d 788 (1996).
3. 130 Wash. 2d 97, 922 P.2d 43 (1996).
4. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 49.60.

Judicial Deference to Administrative Construction
national origin, sex, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical
disability.5 The Act declares that the right to be free from such
discrimination is a civil right enforceable by private civil action by
members of the enumerated protected classes.6 Further, the Law Against
Discrimination may not be construed to deny any person the right to
bring a cause of action for a violation of his or her civil rights.7 Although
this general civil right encompasses those rights expressly enumerated in
the Act, that list of rights is not exclusive!
The Law Against Discrimination also defines and proscribes a
number of prohibited "unfair practices" against members of protected
classes. Thus, it is an unfair practice to engage in a discriminatory act
against a member of a protected class with respect to the following
activities: applying for and receiving credit;9 acquiring and maintaining
insurance; l° conducting real estate transactions, furnishing real estate
facilities, or providing real estate services;" using and enjoying places
of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement; 2 obtaining
and maintaining employment; 3 and requiring HIV testing as a condition
for employment. 4 In contrast to violations of the general civil right to be
free from discrimination, unfair practices are subject to both private civil
and administrative remedies.' 5
The Act created the Washington State Human Rights Commission
and grants it general jurisdiction and powers, 6 including the authority to
"adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind suitable rules and regulations to
carry out the provisions" of the Act and the "policies and practices of the
5. See § 49.60.010. Other protected classes include families with children, marital status, age,
and the use of a trained guide dog or service dog by a disabled person. See § 49.60.010.

6. See § 49.60.030(1), (2).
7. See § 49.60.020.
8. See § 49.60.030(1). The provision states that the general civil right to be free from
discrimination "shall include, but not be limited to" the areas of employment; places of public
resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement; real estate transactions; credit transactions;
insurance transactions; and commerce. § 49.60.030(1).

9. See §§ 49.60.175-.176.
10. See § 49.60.178 (1996).
11. See § 49.60.222 (1996).
12. See § 49.60.215 (1996).
13. See § 49.60.180 (1996).
14. See § 49.60.172 (1996).

15. See § 49.60.020 (1996) (granting right to pursue any civil remedy for violation of person's
civil rights); § 49.60.030(2) (1996) (granting right to bring civil action for any violation of Act);

§ 49.60.120(4) (1996) (limiting Commission to receiving, partially investigating, and passing upon
complaints alleging "unfair practices" as defined in Act).
16. See § 49.60.010 (1996).
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commission in connection therewith."17 The Commission also may
"receive, impartially investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging
unfair practices" as defined by the Act.18 Finally, language in the Act
mandates liberal construction to accomplish its purposes,19 which has
been interpreted to mean that the Act's protections against
discrimination must be construed liberally and its exceptions narrowly
confined.20
B.

Legislative History

The Law Against Discrimination was enacted in 1949 to eliminate
and prevent discrimination in employment against Washington
inhabitants because of race, creed, color, or national origin,2 and thus
was originally much narrower in scope than it is now. Accordingly, the
general civil right to be free from discrimination covered fewer
protected classes and was limited to employment.' Further, employers
were defined to include only those employers who employ eight or more
persons." The 1949 law, however, mandated liberal construction24 and
provided the Human Rights Commission with the same general
jurisdiction and powers that it currently possesses.' But because no right
to bring private civil actions was granted by the 1949 law, the
Commission effectively had exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of
the Act.
The scope of the Act has expanded considerably over the past five
decades to achieve its current broad remedial form. The Law Against
Discrimination was amended in 1957 to provide the right to any person
to pursue any action or remedy for a violation of his or her civil rights,2 6
and again in 1973 to establish the right to bring a private civil action by
any person for specific violations of the Act. Thus, although the right
17. § 49.60.120(3) (1996).
18. § 49.60.120(4).

19.
20.
21.
22.

See § 49.60.020.
See Phillips v. City of Seattle, 111 Wash. 2d 903, 908, 766 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1989).
See Law Against Discrimination, ch. 183, § 1, 1949 Wash. Laws 506.
See § 12, 1949 Wash. Laws at 517.

23. See § 3(b), 1949 Wash. Laws at 507. "Employe" also did not include "any religious,
charitable, educational, social, or fraternal association or corporation, not organized for private
profit." 1949 Wash. Laws at 507.
24. See § 12, 1949 Wash. Laws at 517.
25. Compare Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.010 (1996) with § 1, 1949 Wash. Laws at 506.

26. See Law Against Discrimination, ch. 37, § 2, 1957 Wash. Laws 108.
27. See Law Against Discrimination, ch. 141, § 3(dX2), 1973 Wash. Laws 420.

Judicial Deference to Administrative Construction
to bring a cause of action for both violations of the general civil right to
be free from discrimination and unfair practices was well established by
1973, the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission continued to be
limited to unfair practices. In addition, the list of rights and the number
of classes protected by the Act underwent a similar, gradual expansion
over the years.2"
II.

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTRUCTION

The scope of judicial review of administrative agency regulations is
still a controversial area of law.2 9 At the center of this controversy is a
debate over the extent to which the authority to interpret statutes may be
divided between agencies and courts." If administrative agencies
exercise too much interpretive authority, the separation of powers
principle may be compromised." But if courts infringe upon an agency's
valid exercise of its interpretive authority, then the agency may not be
able to perform its regulatory role effectively.32 Therefore, deference to
an agency's interpretation of the law is often appropriate, or even
required, depending on the factors taken into consideration by the
reviewing court. 3
Prior to 1984, there was no unifying principle clarifying when courts
were to defer to the construction of statutes provided by administrative
agencies. Instead, courts adhered to certain established rules of judicial

28. See, e.g., Law Against Discrimination, ch. 259, § 1, 1995 Wash. Laws 952 (families with
children); Law Against Discrimination, ch. 510, § 3, 1993 Wash. Laws 2232-33 (use of trained
guide dog or service dog by disabled person); Law Against Discrimination, ch. 206, §§ 902-903,

1988 Wash. Laws 961-62 (HIV infection); Law Against Discrimination, ch. 214, § 3, 1973 Wash.
Laws 1649 (handicap); Law Against Discrimination, ch. 141, § 1, 1973 Wash. Laws 419 (credit
transactions, insurance transactions, sex, marital status, and age); Law Against Discrimination, 1st
ex. s. ch. 167, § 2, 1969 Wash. Laws 1172 (real estate transactions); Law Against Discrimination,
ch. 141, § 3, 1957 Wash. Laws 108-09 (places of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, and

amusement).
29. See Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California
Administrative.Agencies,42 UCLA L. Rev. 1157, 1159 (1995).
30. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev.
549,550-51(1985).
31. See Asimow, supranote 29, at 1159.

32 Id
33. See Theodore L. Garrett, JudicialReview After Chevron: The Courts Reassert Their Role, 10
Nat. Resources & Env't 59 (1995).
34. See Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 972
(1992).
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deference. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.35 established a two-part test for the
federal courts to use to determine when such deference must be given.3 6
Courts that continue to follow the pre-Chevron approach, however, take
into account a number of considerations in determining whether to defer
to an agency's construction, including the following factors: whether the
legislature has "delegated rule making authority to the agency"; whether
judicial deference to agency interpretations was intended by the
legislature; whether the agency has expertise in the particular matter;
whether "the agency's interpretation was contemporanaeous with the
statute in question"; and whether a subsequent legislature, "aware of the
agency's interpretation, ratified the agency's view."37 The more these
factors indicate an agency's authority to interpret legislative intent and
its ability to interpret that intent accurately, the more likely courts will
defer to it.
A.

JudicialDeference to Administrative Construction in General

Because the primary goal of statutory interpretation is to find and
give effect to legislative intent as expressed in the language of the
statute in question, courts may look to an administrative construction of
that statute only if the statutory language is ambiguous.3 8 The
Legislature, however, may have made a clear delegation of interpretive
authority to the administering agency. In that case, the reviewing court
must refrain from substituting its own interpretation for that of the
agency, as long as the agency's interpretation is not irrational.39 Between
these two extremes, the deference accorded to an administrative
interpretation depends on the importance of the various factors
considered by the reviewing court.

35. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

36. This test has two parts: (1) if the statute unambiguously expresses the intent of Congress by
speaking directly on the issue in question, then that is the end of the matter and no deference will
be given to an agency's construction, and (2) if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, then the court must defer to the agency's construction of the statute it administers as
long as that construction is based on a permissible interpretation of the statute. Id. at 842-43.
37. See Garrett,supra note 33, at 59. Other factors include whether "the agency's interpretation
is long-standing or consistent with earlier interpretations" and whether "the agency engaged in a
thorough and reasoned analysis in reaching its interpretation." l

38. See Roznerv. City of Bellevue, 116 Wash. 2d 342,347, 804 P.2d 24,27 (1991).
39. See Diver, supra note 30, at 570 (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,
568 (1980)). "Clear evidence of interpretive intent" will be rare, however, because the legislature
"seldom provides explicit guidance" on how courts are to interpret the statutory language. Ld

Judicial Deference to Administrative Construction
Delegation of interpretive authority to an administrative agency,
"congruence" between legislative intent and the agency's construction,
and the specific attributes of the agency's interpretation probably are the
most important factors considered by courts.4" The deference accorded
to an administrative regulation depends to a large extent on whether the
Legislature has made a specific delegation of legislative rule-making
authority to the regulatory agency. Regulations promulgated pursuant to
such delegated authority are entitled to great deference, while
regulations lacking "specific delegated authority" may exert at most a
persuasive influence.4
Deference also may be appropriate if the administrative agency
possesses a "comparative interpretive advantage" over the reviewing
court. 42 Because agencies often are "immersed" in the administration of
a particular statute, they often become specialists in that area of the law,
whereas courts tend to remain generalists.43 Such specialization gives
agencies the ability to gain a better grasp of technical terms or the
practical consequences of a decision.' Further, as a specialist, an agency
often possesses "intimate knowledge" of specific problems dealt with by
the statute and the various "administrative consequences" resulting from
particular interpretations.45 Courts often lack the time, personnel, and
resources available to an administrative agency and thus may not be able
to interpret a particular statute as accurately as the agency could.46
Other factors may operate to convince a court to defer to an
administrative construction. Courts defer to an agency's long-standing
construction that has been consistently maintained because such
construction is likely to induce reliance on the part of the public or other
agencies.47 In addition, if the construction was considered carefully by
the responsible agency and supported by reasoned analysis, it will be
accorded greater deference.48 Further, an administrative construction
promulgated contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute is
entitled to even more weight because the agency most likely either
40. See Merrill, supra note 34, at 973.
41. Id. at 973; see also 1 Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
§ 6.3 (3d ed. 1994).
42. See Asimow, supra note 29, at 1195.
43. Id. at 1196.
44. See Merrill, supra note 34, at 973.
45. See Asimow, supranote 29, at 1196.
46. See Diver, supranote 30, at 575.
47. See Asimow, supranote 29, at 1197; Merrill, supra note 34, at 973.
48. See Asimow, supranote 29, at 1196; Merrill, supra note 34, at 974.
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participated in the drafting of the legislation or otherwise was familiar
with the assumptions inherent in the legislative process.4 S Finally, if the
statute is reenacted with knowledge of the prior administrative
construction and is not modified in a way suggesting a rejection of that
construction, then again deference is due."
B.

Washington s Approach to JudicialDeference to Administrative
Construction

Under Washington law, an administrative agency has only the powers
and authority either expressly granted or necessarily implied to it by the
Legislature." Although an administrative agency may not promulgate
regulations that amend or change a statute, it may "fill in the gaps" if
needed to effect the general statutory scheme. 2 In addition, courts are to
presume that an administrative regulation "adopted pursuant to a
legislative grant of authority" is valid, and must uphold ite regulation if
it is reasonably consistent with the statute being implemented." Further,
the Legislature may delegate to an administrative agency the power to
determine "a fact or state of things upon which application of the law is
made to depend," provided the relevant statute enunciates standards to
guide the agency.54
Washington courts take into account a variety of factors in
determining when to defer to an administrative construction. The
importance placed on each factor, however, is not uniform. Great weight
is given to the construction of a statute by the agency responsible for
administering it, if the construction is reasonably consistent with the
statute being implemented and there is no compelling indication that it
conflicts with legislative intent.5 5 Even greater deference! must be given
to the contemporaneous construction of a statute, if that construction is
accompanied by silent legislative acquiescence over a long period of

49. See Asimow, supra note 29, at 1197; Merrill, supranote 34, at 974.
50. See Asimow, supra note 29, at 1197; Merrill, supranote 34, at 974.

51. See Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 374, 610 P.2d 857, E;60 (1980); Gugin v.
Sonico, Inc., 68 Wash. App. 826, 829, 846 P.2d 571, 573 (1993).
52. See Gugin, 68 Wash. App. at 829, 846 P.2d at 573.
53. See Fahn, 93 Wash. 2d at 374,610 P.2d at 860.

54. Id.
55. See Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d
62, 68-69,586 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1978).

Judicial Deference to Administrative Construction
time. 6 An administrative construction that is outside an agency's field
of expertise is entitled to no special deference." The deference accorded
to an administrative agency also may depend in part upon "the particular
combination of facts, statutes, regulations, and underlying public
policies" of each case.58 Thus, even though Washington Supreme Court
decisions reveal at times a "varying intensity" of judicial review,
Washington courts usually give deference to the content of an
administrative regulation, particularly if the statute being implemented
is ambiguous or states broad remedial goals.59
C.

Application ofJudicialDeference to Administrative Construction
of the Act

Washington courts have given substantial deference to the Human
Rights Commission's constructions of the Law Against Discrimination
because of the Commission's broad rule-making and policy-formulation
powers and administrative expertise. The Washington Supreme Court
has held that the Legislature intended to give the Human Rights
Commission "broad powers to investigate and formulate policies with
respect to practices which involve discrimination based upon those
attributes, conditions, and situations" the Legislature had found to
constitute "an unfair basis for such discrimination."6 According to the
court, the Legislature did not "attempt to designate" all practices
constituting discrimination, but rather granted the Commission "the
authority to do so.",61 Further, the court noted that the Legislature
recognized that "the diligence and expertise of an administrative
agency" was necessary to achieve the purposes of the Law Against
Discrimination, and that the different forms of prohibited discrimination,
56. See Newschwander v. Board of Trustees of the Wash. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 94
Wash. 2d 701, 711, 620 P.2d 88, 94 (1980) (giving great weight to regulation interpreting statute
governing rights and duties of teachers with Teachers' Retirement System credit, adopted by
Washington State Teachers' Retirement System Board of Trustees "immediately" following
enactment of statute in 1963).
57. Russell v. Department of Human Rights, 70 Wash. App. 408, 412, 854 P.2d 1087, 1090
(1993) (finding that although City of Seattle's Department of Human Rights was entitled to "no
special deference" with respect to applicability of court rule governing relation back of amended
pleadings, because Department had no expertise in interpreting court rules, it did not err in
concluding that Russell had engaged in employment discrimination).
58. See Tim J. Filer, The Scope ofJudicialReview ofAgency Actions in Washington RevisitedDoctrine,Analysis, and ProposedRevisions, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 653, 660 (1985).
59. Id. at 665-66.
60. See Washington Water Power Co., 91 Wash. 2d at 67-68,586 P.2d at 1153.
61. Id at 68, 586 P.2dat 1153.
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"taken in conjunction with the statement of policy and purpose," serve
as "guidelines" for the Human Rights Commission. 62 The Commission's
authority to promulgate regulations, however, does not include the
'
power to amend or change legislative enactments.53
In general,
Washington courts have refused to defer to the Human Rights
Commission's constructions of the Law Against Discrimination only
when it has issued a regulation that clearly amends the Act.
1.

Washington CourtsDefer to the Commission s Constructionsof the
Act When Consistent with Legislative Intent and Within the
Commission 's Powers andAuthority

Courts often look to and rely on the Commission's construction of the
Law Against Discrimination when the statutory language is ambiguous
or the legislative intent is unclear. In Washington Water Power Co. v.
Washington State Human Rights Commission,64 the Washington
Supreme Court held that the Commission was justified in finding that
the Legislature did not intend the Act "to restrict its coverage to cases
where the employer refuses to hire any married person or any unmarried
person."6 The Commission had interpreted the Act to bar discrimination
against any employee or job applicant because of the person's marital
status, who his or her spouse is, or what the spouse dces. 6 The court
held that this interpretation did not exceed the Commission's authority
because such discrimination necessarily involves the examination of an
employee's marital status.67
The Washington Supreme Court deferred to the Human Rights
Commission's construction of the Law Against Discrimination in
adopting its definition of the term "age." In Gross v. City ofLynnwood,6 8
the court agreed with the Commission that the language in one statute,
making it an unfair practice to refuse to employ persons between the

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 68-69, 586 P.2d at 1153.
See Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 383, 610 P.2d 857, 865 (1980).
91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149.
Id. at 69, 586 P.2d at 1153.
See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-150(2) (1995).

67. Washington Water Power Co., 91 Wash. 2d at 68, 586 P.2d at 1153. The court thus found
that an "anti-nepotism" policy, whereby Washington businesses refused to hire the spouses of
employees, was an unfair practice based on marital status discrimination an. therefore prohibited
by the Act. Id. at 69, 586 P.2d at 1154; see also Magula v. Benton Franklin Title Co., 131 Wash.
2d 171,930 P.2d 307 (1997) (also adopting Commission's construction of term "marital status").
68. 90 Wash. 2d 395,583 P.2d 1197 (1978).

Judicial Deference to Administrative Construction
ages of forty and sixty-five, 9 qualified the prohibition against age
discrimination in employment contained in the Act, which does not itself
define the term "age."7' The court held that the general purpose of an age
discrimination statute, providing protection for older workers in
obtaining or maintaining employment, was "clearly reflected" in the
regulations promulgated by the Commission.7 In noting that the
regulations were "entitled to considerable deference" because they were
the construction of a statute "by those whose duty it is to administer its
terms," the court adopted the Commission's interpretation.72
Courts also have relied on and given great deference to the
'
Commission's construction of the scope of the term "handicap."73
In

Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co.,74 the court of appeals had to
decide whether a person perceived to have a handicap, but who was not
handicapped, should be considered handicapped for the purposes of the
Act.7" The Human Rights Commission had issued a regulation stating
that "handicap" includes circumstances where a sensory, mental, or
physical condition is "perceived to exist, whether or not it exists in
fact,"76 and the court found this interpretation to be within the scope of.
the Act.77 Inrecognizing the statutory mandate for liberal construction
and the Commission's "broad discretion and responsibility" for
administering the Act, the court found that legislative purpose would be
defeated if the handicap provisions were limited only to those persons
actually afflicted with a handicap.78

69. See Law Against Discrimination, ch. 100, § 5, 1961 Wash. Laws 1588-89 (codified as
amended at Wash. Rev. Code § 49.44.090).
70. Gross, 90 Wash. 2d at 399 n.6, 583 P.2d at 1200 n.6 (citing older version of Wash. Admin.
Code § 160-04-010(2), (12)). "Age" now means between 40 and 70. See Wash. Admin. Code §

162-04-010 (1995).
71. Gross, 90 Wash. 2d at 399,583 P.2d at 1199.
72. Id. The court thus found that the City of Lynnwood and its civil service commission's
refusal to appoint Gross to the position of fire fighter because he was 35 years old and therefore
ineligible for enrollment in a mandatory retirement system did not violate the age discrimination
provisions of the Act. Id at 396-401,583 P.2d at 1198-1200.
73. The Act no longer uses the term "handicap." Instead, that term has been replaced by the term
"disability." See Law Against Discrimination, ch. 510, §§ 1-20, 1993 Wash. Laws 2331-43
(codified as amended at Wash. Rev. Code ch. 49.60).
74. 22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461 (1979).

75. See id. at 577, 591 P.2d at 462.
76. See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-22-040(1) (1995).
77. See Barnes,22 Wash. App. at 583, 591 P.2d at 465.
78. Id at 581-82, 591 P.2d at 464. The court thus held that Barnes had standing to maintain a

cause of action against the Washington Natural Gas Company for allegedly discharging him from
his job because he was handicapped. See id. at 583, 591 P.2d at 465; see also Kimmel v. Crowley
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The Washington Supreme Court, in Phillips v. City of Seattle,79 again
deferred to the Commission's definition of handicap and declined to
apply the stricter affirmative action definition of the term. In so holding,
the court noted that "a large number of people" would be excluded from
the protection of the Act if the affirmative action definition is used in
unfair practice cases.8" The court further justified its ruling by
emphasizing that it had a duty both to construe the Act liberally to
accomplish the purposes of the Legislature and to give great weight to
the Commission's definition of handicap for unfair practice claims."1
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court has allowed the Human
Rights Commission to narrow the scope of ambiguous statutory terms
when interpreting the terms broadly would run counter to the purposes
of the Act. In Bennett v. Hardy,82 the court refused to apply the
definition of "employer" outside the Law Against Discrimination so as
to bar an implied cause of action brought under a separate age
employment discrimination statute." The court held thai: applying any
limiting aspect outside the Act itself would be inconsistent with its
"express statements of broad purpose."84 The limiting aspect at issue
concerned the small employee exemption under the Act's definition of
employer.8 The Commission had interpreted the principal purposes of
that exemption to be (1) to "relieve small businesses of a regulatory
burden," and (2) in "the interest of cost effectiveness, to confine public
agency enforcement of the law to those employers whose practices
affect a substantial number of persons." 6 The court found that these
Maritime Corp., 23 Wash. App. 78, 596 P.2d 1069 (1979) (adopting Commission's definition of
term "handicap" in finding that person, whose handicap does not prevent him from properly
performing job he seeks, is handicapped).
79. 111 Wash. 2d 903, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989).
80. Id. at 908, 766 P.2d at 1102. The court held, however, that Phillips, who was diagnosed as a
"periodic alcoholic," was terminated by the City of Seattle solely because of his absenteeism from
his job and not because he had a handicap. See id. at 911,766 P.2d at 1103-04.
81. See id. at 908, 766 P.2d at 1102; see also Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash. 2d 8, 846 P.2d 531
(1993) (using Commission's definition of term "handicap" to find that transsexualism was not
handicap for enforcement purposes in unfair practice cases).
82. 113 Wash. 2d 912, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990).
83. See id.at 929, 784 P.2d at 1266.
84. Id. at 928, 784 P.2d at 1265. The court thus found that Bennett could b-ing a tort claim for
wrongful discharge based upon her age and in retaliation for her opposition to her employer's
discriminatory practices. Id. at 929, 922 P.2d at 1266.
85. The Act defines the term "employer" as including "any person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any
religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit." Wash. Rev. Code §
49.60.040(3) (1996).
86. See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-160(2) (1995).
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purposes "will in no way be interfered with by permitting private causes
of action against employers whose size keeps them outside the scope of
public agency regulation," and, moreover, that permitting such causes of
action by individual plaintiffs could only assist the Human Rights
Commission "in furthering the goal of preventing and eliminating
employment discrimination."87 The court also found that it could
consider the Commission's construction because it was a
contemporaneous construction of the Act that had been accompanied by
silent legislative acquiescence over a long period of time.88
2.

No Deference Is Given when the Commission Has Clearly
Amended or Changedthe Act

Although courts retain the ultimate authority to determine the
meaning of the Law Against Discrimination, and thus may substitute
their own interpretation for that of the Human Rights Commission, they
generally have done so only when the Commission clearly has abused its
delegated powers by amending or changing the Act in some way.
In Fahn v. Cowlitz County,89 the Washington Supreme Court
invalidated part of a Commission regulation that declared when preemployment inquiries relating to the height and weight of job applicants
could be conducted.9" The regulation stated that being a certain height
and weight could not be considered a job requirement unless the
employer could show that no employee with the ineligible height or
weight could do the work, and it specified that any such inquiry not
based on actual job requirements was an unfair pre-employment
inquiry.9" Because of "the broad directive from the Legislature," the
court found that it was "well within" the Commission's authority to
determine that such inquiries, when not related to the requirements of
the job, constitute unfair employment practices if they unfavorably
impact a protected class.9" Because the regulation prevented preemployment height and weight inquiries in "virtually all" situations,
however, the court found that "in effect" it created a new protected class
87. Bennett, 113 Wash. 2d at 929,784 P.2d at 1266.

88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 927, 784 P.2d at 1265.
93 Wash. 2d 368, 610 P.2d 857 (1980).
See id.at 370-71, 610 P.2d at 858-59.
See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-12-140(3)(g) (1995).

92. See Fahn, 93 Wash. 2d at 377, 610 P.2d at 862. Women and some minority groups, such as
Mexican-Americans, were found to have been unfavorably impacted. See id. at 376, 610 P.2d at
861.
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based on height and weight.93 This was a power that the court found is
not granted to administrative agencies.94
In Gugin v. Sonico, Inc.,95 the Washington Court of Appeals
invalidated a regulation promulgated by the Human Rights Commission
that made it an unfair practice for an employer "to refuse to hire or
otherwise discriminate against a person simply because he or she has
been convicted of a crime. ' ,96 The Commission found that "an
employment practice which automatically excludes a person with a prior
criminal conviction" had the potential to discriminate. 97 The court,
however, held that the regulation created an additional class protected by
the Law Against Discrimination, composed of all persons who had been
convicted of a crime, and that it therefore exceeded the Commission's
delegated powers and authority.98
Washington courts have deferred to constructions of the Law Against
Discrimination by the Human Rights Commission where such
constructions are necessary to further the purposes of -:he Act. Thus,
courts have adopted the Commission's interpretation of the definitions
of marital status, age, handicap, and employer, even though these
constructions appear to go further than the language of the Act itself.
Such deference is appropriate because effective implementation of the
Act requires an agency that can administer and enforce its provisions in
a manner that is both consistent with legislative intent and responsive to
new or unanticipated forms of discrimination. In contrast, the courts
have struck down those constructions of the Act issued by the
Commission that clearly change the meaning of the Act beyond what the
Legislature had intended. This is particularly true where the Commission
creates a new protected class or right. Thus, regulations interpreting the
Act to bar discrimination on the basis of height and weight or prior
criminal convictions alone have been held invalid. Deference should not
93. Id. at 383, 610 P.2d at 865. The court thus reversed the trial court's order of summary
judgment and remanded the case for trial on the issue of whether Fahn had been discriminated
against in applying for a deputy sheriff's position for which all applicants were required to be at
least 5'9" tall. See id at 383-84, 610 P.2d at 865.
94. See id. at 383, 610 P.2d at 865.
95. 68 Wash. App. 826, 846 P.2d 571 (1993).
96. Id. at 828, 846 P.2d at 572 (quoting Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-06C(1)). The regulation
also stated that "the conviction may be considered to the extent that it reveals the current presence
or absence of specific qualifications for a job." Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-060(1).
97. Gugin, 68 Wash. App. at 830, 846 P.2d at 573.
98. See id. at 831, 846 P.2d at 574. The court reversed a jury verdict in fivor of Gugin's suit
against Sonico, his former employer, on the basis that Gugin had been fired for having been
convicted of a crime. See id at 826-27, 846 P.2d at 572.

Judicial Deference to Administrative Construction
be given in these situations because such constructions clearly amend
the Act, a power that only the Legislature may wield.
I.

THE GRIFFINAND MARQUIS DECISIONS

The Washington Supreme Court took two very different approaches
to judicial deference to the Human Rights Commission's construction of
the Law Against Discrimination in Griffin v. Eller99 and Marquis v. City
of Spokane.' In Griffin, the court declined to give any deference to the
Commission's construction of the Act's definition of employer, holding
that employers with fewer than eight employees are exempt from the
entire Act rather than just from administrative remedies.' 0 ' In Marquis,
however, the court gave substantial deference to the Commission's
construction of the Law Against Discrimination, granting independent
contractors the right to bring a cause of action for violations of their civil
rights, and held that the Act did grant such a right." 2 The differences in
the court's approaches are striking considering that the two cases were
decided on the same day.'
A.

Griffin v. Eller

1.

Facts andProceduralHistory

Sharon Griffin was hired in September, 1990 by Carson Eller to be
his legal secretary, and, during the time she worked for him, was his
only full-time employee. 4 In July 1991, Eller terminated Griffin,
indicating that he could no longer afford to employ her." 5 Griffin
alleged that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment and
that she had been terminated in retaliation for her objections.0 6 Griffin
brought a civil action against Eller for sexual harassment and retaliation
in violation of the Law Against Discrimination, wrongful termination in
violation of public policy, negligent infliction of emotional distress,

99. 130 Wash. 2d 58, 922 P.2d 788 (1996).
100. 130 Wash. 2d 97, 922 P.2d 43 (1996).
101. See Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 61,922 P.2d at 789.
102. See Marquis, 130 Wash. 2d at 100, 922 P.2d at 45.
103. See Marquis, 130 Wash. 2d at 97, 922 P.2d at 43; Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 58, 922 P.2d at
788.
104. See Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 61, 922 P.2d at 789.
105. See id at 61-62,'922 P.2d at 789.
106. See id. at 62, 922 P.2d at 789.
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outrage, and failure to pay wages. 10 7 The trial court granted partial
summary judgment, dismissing the sexual harassment and retaliation
claims. Griffin appealed to the Washington Supreme Cor.'t. '
2.

The Court Interpretedthe Act To Exempt All Employers with
Fewer than Eight Employees

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the claims.
In interpreting the Law Against Discrimination's definition of
"employer" to exempt all employers who have less than eight
employees," 9 the court found no legislative history suggesting the
Legislature intended to permit "a statutory cause of action against small,
otherwise exempt, employers.""' Because Griffin dealt with a "statutory
exemption," rather than with "statutory silence," as in Marquis,"' the
court distinguished the two cases." 2 The court stated that "an employer
which does not meet the statutory definition" is simply "exempt."" 3
The court declined to give any deference to the Human Rights
Commission's construction of the statutory purposes for the small
employer exemption. The Commission interpreted these purposes to be
(1) to "relieve small employers of a regulatory burden," and (2) in "the
interest of cost effectiveness, to confine public agency enforcement of
the law to employers whose practices affect a substantial number of
persons."".4 Thus, under this construction, the small employer exemption
applies only to the jurisdiction of the Commission. Although the court
recognized that "great weight" must be given the Human Rights
Commission's "contemporaneous construction" of the Act if that
construction "has been accompanied by silent acquiescence of the
legislative body over a long period of time,"".5 the court found that this
regulation was "hardly a 'contemporaneous' construction of the

107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See id.
See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(3) (1996); see also supranote 77.
See Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 63, 922 P.2d at 790.

11I. See infra Part III.B.
112. See Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 63, 922 P.2d at 790.

113. Id. at 64, 922 P.2d at 790.
114. Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-160(2) (1995).
115. See Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 68, 922 P.2d at 792 (quoting Newschwander v. Board of

Trustees of the Wash. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 94 Wash. 2d 701, 711, 620 P.2d 88, 94
(1980)).
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statutory definition" and thus declined to adopt it." 6 The court also
observed that the Legislature may have had other legitimate reasons, in
addition to 1 those
provided by the Commission, for exempting small
7
employers.'
3.

The Dissent

The dissent argued that because there must be a "means by which to
vindicate and maintain" the right to be free from discrimination in
employment granted by the Law Against Discrimination, the majority
had rendered this "statutory imperative" powerless as to those persons
who work for small employers."' The dissent also criticized the majority
for ignoring statutory language granting any person injured by a
violation of the Act, including any violation of the right to be free from
discrimination, the right to bring a cause of action to enforce that right.
Had the Legislature intended to deny this right to persons who work for
small employers, the dissent argued, it could have made such an
intention clear in other provisions of the Act." 9
The dissent also criticized the majority for not giving effect to a
harmonious interpretation of the whole Act. 2 ' The dissent argued that
the Act established two different kinds of discriminatory conduct:
"unfair practices" subject to the jurisdiction of the Human Rights
Commission and the "general civil right" to be free from discrimination
to be enforced through private civil and criminal remedies.'
In
addition, the dissent argued that the majority's interpretation of the Law
Against Discrimination resulted in "unlikely, absurd or strained
consequences"; persons employed by large employers are protected,
while "hundreds of
thousands" of persons working for small employers
22
are not protected.
116. Id at 69, 922 P.2d at 792. The court found that, whereas the definition had been enacted in
1949 with the original version of the Act, the regulation had not been promulgated until 1982, 33
years after the Act was first enacted and nine years after the private cause of action was created in

1973. See Id.
117. See id
118. See id. at 74-75, 922 P.2d at 795 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 77, 922 P.2d at 796 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 77, 922 P.2d at 796-97 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).

121. See id. at 78-79, 922 P.2d at 797 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 80-81, 922 P.2d at 798 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). In 1992, approximately 75%
of all Washington business establishments employed less than nine employees, and those
establishments employed about 17.5% of the private employee work force. Id. at 68, 922 P.2d at
792 (citing U.S. Bureau of Census, County Business Patterns1992: Washington 49 (1994)).
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Finally, the dissent criticized the majority for not according deference
to the Human Rights Commission's construction of the Act, which
limited the statutory exemption only to administrative remedies 2 The
dissent argued that the Legislature had amended the Law Against
Discrimination "dozens of times" without correcting the Commission's
construction." 4 Also, the dissent argued that administrative
[the] passage of the
constructions "need not be contemporaneous with
25
authorizing legislation" to acquire "legal force."'
B.

Marquis v. City of Spokane

1.

Facts and ProceduralHistory

In December 1986, Patti Marquis entered into a three-year contract
with the City of Spokane to serve as a golf professional at one of the
City's three municipally-owned golf courses.126 After learning that she
was being paid markedly less than the City's two other golf
professionals, both of whom were male, Marquis expressed her concern
to the City's golf manager. 7 She also alleged that during the time she
worked for the City, she was subjected to discriminatory treatment.' In
December 1989, contract renewal negotiations began, but the City
refused to renew unconditionally Marquis's contract.' 29 The City offered
a one-year probationary contract, which Marquis refused. 3 Marquis
negotiations, and her contract expired at the end of the
terminated
3
'
year.1
Marquis filed a civil action against the City, alleging sex
discrimination in violation of the Law Against Discrimiration and Title
VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.132 The trial court dismissed
both the Title VII and state law claims, finding that neither act
prohibited discrimination against independent contractors. 33 The court
dissenting).
123. See id. at 87-88, 922 P.2d at 801-02 (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting).
124. See id. at 89-90, 922 P.2d at 802-03 (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting).
125. See id. at 90, 922 P.2d at 803 (Talmadge, J.,
126. See Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash. 2d 97, 101,922 P.2d 43, 45 (1996).
127. See id. at 101-02, 922 P.2d at 46.
128. See id. at 102, 922 P.2d at 46.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 102-03, 922 P.2d at 46.
See id. at 103, 922 P.2d at 46.
See id.
See id. at 103, 922 P.2d at 46-47.
See id at 103-04, 922 P.2d at 47.
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of appeals reversed, holding that the Law Against Discrimination could
be interpreted to incorporate personal contract rights.'34 The Washington
Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the Law Against
Discrimination grants a cause of action to independent contractors. 3
2.

The Court FoundIndependent ContractorsHave the Right To
Bring a Cause of-Action

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
decision.' 36 The court found that the list of civil rights protected by the
Law Against Discrimination was "nonexclusive," and that the extent of
"the scope of those rights" had not been defined.'37 Thus, it was open to
interpretation by the court. The court then acknowledged that the Act
must be "interpreted in the manner that best fulfills the legislative
purpose and intent," and that "liberal construction" is mandated.'38
Further, the court acknowledged that no person may be denied the right
to bring a cause of action based on a "violation of his or her civil rights,"
and that it must "view with caution" constructions that "narrow the
coverage of the law."'39
The court also relied on a 1982 regulation promulgated by the Human
Rights Commission, which declared that independent contractors are
protected by the general civil right to be free from discrimination and
thus may enforce that right through private civil action. 4 Recognizing
that "great weight" must be given to the responsible agency's
construction, the court found that independent contractors could bring a
cause of action for violations of their civil rights.' 4 ' The court also found
that the regulation did not create a new protected class because
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id. at 104, 922 P.2d at 47.
See id.
See id. at 116, 922 P.2d at 53.
Id. at 107, 922 P.2d at 49; see Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1) (1996).
See Marquis, 130 Wash. 2d at 108, 922 P.2d at 49.

139. See Id. at 108, 922 P.2d at 49.
140. Id. at 111-12, 922 P.2d at 50-51. The regulation reads in relevant part:
(2) Rights of independent contractor. While an independent contractors [sic] does not have the
protection of RCW 49.60.180, the contractor is protected by RCW 49.60.030(1) from
discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, handicap, or foreign boycotts.
The general civil right defined in RCW 49.60.030(1) is enforceable by private lawsuit in court
under RCW 49.60.030(2) but not by actions of the Washington state human rights
commission.
Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-170(2) (1995).
141. See Marquis, 130 Wash. 2d at 112-13, 922 P.2d at 51.
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independent contractors must prove they are members of'a class already
protected by the Act. 4 '
The Dissent

3.

The dissent criticized the majority for placing undue reliance on the
Act's broad statement of policy and liberal construction, which the
dissent implied resulted in a strained and unrealistic interpretation of the
Law Against Discrimination.143 The dissent argued that because
independent contractors receive no mention in the Act, such a right
should not be included within its scope because no protected right had
ever been created by the Legislature without it also "simultaneously and
expressly defining" a corresponding statutory violation in detail.'" The
dissent also criticized the majority for relying on the cor.struction of the
Act provided by the Human Rights Commission. The dissent argued that
because the Commission had no special expertise in deciding whether
the Legislature had intended to grant a cause of action to independent
contractors, its regulation was in essence an agency amendment to the
Act and it thus had exceeded its delegated authority by creating a new
statutory right. 4 5 The dissent further argued that such a delegation of
authority, even if granted by the Legislature, would be "an
unconstitutional delegation of purely legislative authority,"1 46 and that
the court's decision was irreconcilable with its decision in Griffin.47
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE GRIFFINDECISION
The Griffin court inexplicably ignored the established rules of judicial
deference by refusing to give any deference to the Human Rights
Commission's construction of the Law Against Discrimination's small
employer exemption, which limited the exemption's applicability solely
to administrative remedies. Instead, the court interpreted the Act to bar
all persons who work for employers with fewer than eight employees
from enforcing their civil rights, an interpretation of the Act that is
contrary to legislative purpose and intent. In contrast, the court in
Marquis properly applied the established principles of judicial deference
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Seeid. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id.at
See id.at
See id.at

112, 922 P.2d at 51.
117, 922 P.2d at 54 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
119, 922 P.2d at 54 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
123, 922 P.2d at 56-57 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
126, 922 P.2d at 58 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
127, 922 P.2d at 59 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
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by correctly deferring to the Commission's construction of the Act,
which granted independent contractors the right to bring a cause of
action for violations of their civil rights. These two approaches are
wholly inconsistent. Whereas the Marquis court's approach
demonstrates proper judicial deference to administrative construction of
the Act, the approach followed in Griffin illustrates how the court
compromises administrative agency authority and frustrates statutory
purpose when it fails to apply properly the established rules of judicial
deference. Further, Griffin shows that such an approach also produces
both incorrect and inconsistent interpretations of legislative intent.
A.

The Griffin CourtIgnored the EstablishedRules ofJudicial
Deference by Misinterpretingthe Law Against Discrimination

Because the Griffin court ignored the established rules of judicial
deference in deciding whether to defer to the Human Rights
Commission's interpretation of the small employer exemption, it
misinterpreted the Law Against Discrimination. The issue before the
court was whether the Act, which defines employers to include those
employers who have eight or more employees, authorizes private civil
actions to be brought against employers who have fewer than eight
employees.' 48 The court wrongly held that such employers are exempt
from the Act, despite a 1982 regulation promulgated by the Human
Rights Commission limiting that exemption to its own administrative
jurisdiction. The reason the court gave for not deferring to this
construction was that the construction had not been promulgated
contemporaneously with the enactment of the provision of the Act
defining employer.'49 By failing to apply correctly the established rules
of judicial deference the Griffin court not only compromised the
interpretive authority of a necessary administrative agency, but it also
fiustrated the purpose of the Law Against Discrimination.
1.

The Court Inexplicably Failed To Follow the EstablishedRules of
JudicialDeference in Evaluatingthe Commission's Construction
ofthe Act

The court inexplicably failed to apply the established rules of judicial
deference that courts use to determine when to defer to a construction of

148. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(3) (1996).
149. See Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash. 2d 58, 68-69, 922 P.2d 788, 792 (1996).
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a statute provided by the agency responsible for administering it. Instead
of determining whether the Commission's construction of the small
employer exemption was a valid exercise of the Commission's authority,
was reasonably consistent with the purpose of the Act, or was in conflict
with legislative intent, as it should have done, 5 ' the court merely looked
to see whether the construction had been promulgated
contemporaneously with the enactment of the statutory provision
defining the term employer.' Under established principles of judicial
deference to administrative construction, however, the issue of
contemporaneity is only one factor courts may consider in making their
determinations.1 2 In fact, there is no requirement that an administrative
construction be contemporaneous with the statutory provision it
interprets." 3
Even if the issue of contemporaneity should be given weight by the
court in evaluating the Human Rights Commission's cor.struction of the
small employer exemption, that issue is outweighed by other more
important considerations. Because the Commission is the agency
responsible for administering the Law Against Discrimination, and thus
has acquired extensive expertise in this area, its ccnstructions are
entitled to deference.' 54 This is particularly true where the Commission's
construction of the Act is reasonably consistent with the purpose of the
Act and there is no compelling indication that it conflicts with legislative
intent."' The Commission's construction of the small employer
exemption merely clarifies the statutory distinction between the general
civil right to be free from discrimination and unfair practices with
respect to those persons working for employers who have fewer than
eight employees." 6 Thus, this construction, far from being an abuse of
delegated authority, actually furthers the Legislature's intent that

150. See Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash.
2d 62, 68-69,586 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1978).
151. See Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 68-69, 922 P.2d at 792.
152. See supraPart II.B.
153. As the dissent points out in Griffin, "Nothing in [Washington's Administrative Procedure
Act] requires an agency to adopt a regulation before the expiration of some unspecified deadline

following the enactment of a statute." Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 90, 922 P.2d at 803. Moreover, lack
of contemporaneity was never an issue in Marquis, despite the fact that the construction under
consideration in that case was promulgated during the same year. See Marquis v. City of Spokane,
130 Wash. 2d 97, 922 P.2d 43 (1996); infra Part IV.B.
154. See 1 Davis & Pierce, supra note 41, at 6.3; Merrill, supra note 34, at 973.
155. See Washington Water Power Co., 91 Wash. 2d at 68-69, 586 P.2d at 1153.
156. See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-160(2) (1995) (expressly stating that small employers
are exempt only "from the enforcement authority of the commission" but not from Act itself).
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persons not be denied the right to pursue any action or remedy for
violations of their civil rights.'57
The issue of contemporaneity also is outweighed by the Human
Rights Commission's authority to interpret the Law Against
Discrimination and its comparative interpretive advantage over the
courts. The Commission has been granted broad rule-making and policyformulation powers with which to administer and enforce the Act. 5 8 The
Washington Supreme Court has found that these delegated powers
indicate a legislative recognition that because every situation in which
discrimination might exist could not be known or anticipated when the
Law Against Discrimination was enacted, the Commission was to use its
"diligence and expertise" to achieve the purposes intended in the Act.'5 9
Thus, the courts consistently have recognized the Commission's
authority to interpret the Law Against Discrimination. 6 Further, the
investigative resources available to the Human Rights Commission and
its decades-long experience in administering the Act give it a distinct
6
comparative interpretive advantage over the courts.' '
Finally, the issue of contemporaneity also must bow to the Human
Rights Commission's careful consideration of its construction of the
small employer exemption and the Legislature's silent acquiescence in
that construction. The Commission clearly recognized the limitations
placed on its authority to interpret the Law Against Discrimination when
it interpreted the small employer exemption to be a limit only on its
authority to enforce the Act with respect to employers who have fewer
than eight employees. 6 Under this construction, persons who work for
such employers still may not seek any administrative remedies for unfair
practices in employment. Thus, the Human Rights Commission made a
careful distinction between its limited enforcement powers and the
general right to bring a cause of action for violations of the Act. Further,
the Legislature has amended the Act a number of times since the
construction was promulgated in 1982, and none of these amendments

157. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020 (1996).
158. See Washington WaterPower Co., 91 W'ash. 2d at 69, 586 P.2d at 1153.
159. See id.
160. See supra Part II.C.1.
161. See Asimow, supra note 29, at 1195-97; Diver, supra note 30, at 575; Merrill, supra note

34, at 973-74.
162. See supranote 156.
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the Commission's interpretation. of the small
indicate a rejection of
63
employer exemption.1
2.

The Court'sApproach to JudicialDeference to the Commission's
Constructionof the Small Employer Exemption Is Logically
Flawed

Even if the Griffin court was justified in emphasizing the issue of
contemporaneity to the extent that it did, such emphasis contradicts the
court's past reliance on the Human Rights Commission's construction of
the small employer exemption. In Bennett v. Hardy,'(, a case the Griffin
court used to support its decision, the court in dicta relied on the same
construction of the small employer exemption to explain why the
Legislature may have included a size limitation in the Act's definition of
employer. 16 The Bennett court stated that it was appropriate to look to
this construction because it was a contemporaneous ccnstruction and
therefore must be accorded great weight. 16 6 Thus, the court still has yet
to decide conclusively whether or not this construction is in fact
contemporaneous.
The court also has agreed in the past with the content of the Human
Rights Commission's construction of the small employer exemption.
According to the Commission, the principal purposes of the small
employer exemption are to relieve small businesses from a regulatory
burden and to reduce administrative costs by restricting the
Commission's regulatory authority to large employers. 67 The Griffin
court noted that the Legislature may have had other reasons for enacting
the small employer exemption. 6 Again, however, the court seems to
have forgotten its earlier reliance on the Commission's construction in
163. See Griffin v. Eller, 130 Wash. 2d 53, 89 n.9, 922 P.2d 788, 802-03 n.9 (1996) (Talmadge,
J., dissenting) (providing comprehensive list of these amendments). The dissent also noted:
Since 1982, the Legislature has amended the Act dozens of times, affecting the pertinent
statutory provisions at issue in this case.... Despite a 14-year track record of frequent and
intense legislative scrutiny of the Act, and the powers, duties and very existence of the
Commission, the Legislature chose not to correct the Commission's interpretation of the
relationship between its own jurisdiction and the civil remedy to sue for discrimination. It is
difficult to imagine a stronger case for legislative acquiescence.
Id. at 89-90, 922 P.2d at 802-03.
164. 113 Wash. 2d 912,784 P.2d 1258 (1990).
165. See id. at 928-29, 784 P.2d at 1265-66.
166. See id. at 928, 922 P.2d at 1265.
167. See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-160(2) (1995).
168. See Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 69, 922 P.2d at 792.
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Bennett. In support of its decision, interpreting the small employer
exemption not to apply outside the Law Against Discrimination to limit
causes of action under other unfair practice statutes, the Bennett court
looked to the Commission's construction of the small employer
exemption and found that allowing private causes of action against
employers with fewer than eight employees only can assist the
Commission in furthering the statutory goal of eliminating and
preventing discrimination.'6 9
3.

The Griffin Decision Both Compromises the Authority of an
AdministrativeAgency andFrustratesthe Purposeof the Act

The Griffin court's logically inconsistent method of evaluating the
Human Rights Commission's construction of the small employer
exemption both compromises the Commission's interpretive authority
and frustrates the purpose of the Law Against Discrimination. The court
failed to recognize the crucial role the Commission serves in
administering the Act. The Commission's administrative expertise, in
addition to giving it a comparative advantage with respect to interpreting
legislative intent, allows it to acquire extensive knowledge of the
consequences associated with particular interpretations of the Act. 7 '
Thus, the Commission often may be better able to avoid those
interpretations that produce real life consequences contrary to good
public policy. If, however, the court, as it did in Griffin, begins to
infringe on the Human Rights Commission's authority to interpret the
Law Against Discrimination, then the Commission's ability to
administer effectively and enforce the Act surely will be compromised.
Although it is still too early to predict what effect this case will have on
judicial deference to administrative construction of the Act, the Griffin
court certainly has taken a step in the wrong direction.
The court's decision not to give any deference to the Human Rights
Commission's construction and, therefore, to interpret the Law Against
169. See Bennett, 113 Wash. 2d at 929, 784 P.2d at 1266.
170. See Diver, supra note 30, at 578, 589. Diver observes:
Compared to agencies, courts possess only limited investigative resources and analytical
faculties. They must rely, therefore, on less accurate estimates of consequential impacts. Thus,
agencies seem to have greater access to the knowledge necessary to understand what is
intended by statutory enactors ....
[B]ecause agencies are more familiar with the range of
policy choices likely to be affected by the interpretation at hand, there is little reason to expect
courts to do a betterjob of reconciling these competing policies.

Id.
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Discrimination to bar causes of action against employers with fewer than
eight employees, also frustrates the statutory goal of eliminating and
preventing discrimination. An interpretation that denies a large segment
of the working population the ability to enforce their civil rights is
contrary the intent of the Legislature,17 ' especially considering the broad
remedial nature of the Act and its statutory mandate of liberal
construction. In addition, the denial of the protections of Ihe state's civil
rights statute to large numbers of people is the kind of unlikely, absurd,
and strained consequence that must be avoided when interpreting a
statute. 72 Furthermore, because the construction of the small employer
exemption clearly indicates that the Commission recognizes the limits
placed on its authority to interpret the Act, the danger that upholding this
construction will result in too much interpretive authority being given to
an administrative agency is small.
The court could have avoided this result, however, had it approached
the issue of judicial deference to administrative construction of the Act
in a manner consistent with the established rules of judicial deference.
Thus the court should have considered whether the Human Rights
Commission had abused its delegated powers by creating a new
protected class, whether the construction was reasonably consistent with
the intent of the Legislature, and whether the construction furthered the
purposes of the statute-the elimination and prevention of prohibited
discriminatory conduct. The court also should have carafully weighed
the construction in light of the Commission's broad rule-making and
policy-formulation powers and its long-standing administrative
expertise. This approach preserves the balance of interpretive authority
between the courts and the Commission, thus insuring that courts adopt
the interpretation that best fulfills the intent of the Legislature and
furthers the purposes of the statute.
B.

The Court's Approach in Marquis DemonstratesPrcperJudicial
Deference to AdministrativeAuthority and Expertise

In contrast to the Griffin court, the Marquis court properly applied the
established rules of judicial deference in correctly deferring to the
Human Rights Commission's construction of the Law Against
171. See Griffin, 130 Wash. 2d at 81, 922 P.2d at 798 (Talmadge, J., dissenting); see also id. at
68, 922 P.2d at 792 (citing U.S. Bureau of Census statistics showing that in 1992 three-quarters of
all Washington businesses employed less than nine employees and that these businesses accounted
for approximately 17.5% of private employee work force).
172. See, e.g., State v. Mierz, 127 Wash. 2d 460, 480-81,901 P.2d 286, 296 (1995).

Judicial Deference to Administrative Construction
Discrimination. The court had to decide whether independent contractors
have the right to bring a cause of action for violations of their civil
rights, even though the Act does not expressly grant them such a right. A
1982 regulation promulgated by the Commission interpreted the Law
Against Discrimination to provide independent contractors with the
general civil right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed,
color, national origin, sex, handicap, and foreign boycotts.'73 This
general civil right is enforceable through private civil action, the
regulation stated, but not through the actions of the Human Rights
Commission. 7 4 The court found that this interpretation was a valid
exercise of the Commission's authority and was consistent with
legislative purpose. 75 Thus, the court correctly gave it great weight in
construing the Act.'76 As was recognized by the dissent in Marquis, the
Marquis court's approach to judicial deference is wholly inconsistent
with the approach followed by the court in Griffin.'77 The Marquis
court's approach is correct, however, because it both preserves the
authority of a necessary administrative agency and furthers the purpose
of the Act.
1.

The ConstructionIs a Valid Exercise of the Commission's
DelegatedAuthority

The Washington Supreme Court found that the Law Against
Discrimination is unambiguous to the extent that it sets forth a
nonexclusive list of rights defining the general civil right to be free from
discrimination, but that it is ambiguous in that it makes a broad
statement of rights without defining the scope of those rights.178 The
Law Against Discrimination specifically declares that the general civil
right to be free from discrimination includes, but is not limited to, the
rights enumerated in the Act.'7 9 Thus, the court was correct in finding
that the Law Against Discrimination's list of enumerated rights may

173. See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-170(2) (1995); see also supra note 140.
174. See Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-170(2); see also supra note 140.
175. See Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash. 2d 97, 112, 922 P.2d 43, 51 (1996).
176. See i

177. See id at 127, 922 P.2d at 59 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 107, 922 P.2d at 49.
179. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1) (1996). These rights include the right to obtain and
hold employment, enjoy any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement,
and engage in real estate, credit, and insurance transactions and in commerce free from

discriminatory boycotts or blacklists. See § 49.60.030(1).
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encompass other rights beyond those listed in the Act, such as the right
to make personal contracts without being discriminated against on the
basis of being a member of an already-protected class.
The Human Rights Commission's construction at issue in Marquis
creates no new protected class. The creation of a protected right or class
is not a valid exercise of the Commission's authority because an
administrative agency may not amend or change a statute.180 To bring a
cause of action under this construction, independent contractors still
must show, however, that they already are members of a protected class
and not merely independent contractors. 81 Further, this construction
does not grant a protected right that is not already available under the
of any person to bring a cause of
Law Against Discrimination, the8 right
2
action for a civil rights violation.
The construction at issue in Marquis is unlike those constructions that
have been invalidated by the courts in the past. In Fahn v. Cowlitz
County,'83 the Washington Supreme Court struck down the Human
Rights Commission's construction of the Law Against Discrimination
because it prohibited all pre-employment inquiries based on height and
weight, regardless of whether the job applicant was a member of a
protected class or not.'84 The court found that such a construction was an
abuse of the Commission's delegated powers and authority, because it
created a protected class consisting of all persons disadvantaged by the
height and weight requirement.' In Gugin v. Sonico, Inc.'86 the court of
appeals invalidated another construction promulgated by the Human
Rights Commission because it prohibited discrimination against any
person convicted of a crime, again regardless of whether he or she was a
member of an already protected class.'87 In contrast, the Commission has
created no protected class of persons discriminated against on the basis
that they are independent contractors.

180. See Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wash. 2d 368, 383, 610 P.2d 857, 865 (1980); Gugin v.

Sonico, Inc., 68 Wash. App. 826, 829, 846 P.2d 571, 573 (1993).
181. See Marquis, 130 Wash. 2d at 112, 922 P.2d at 51.

182. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020 (1996).
183. 93 Wash. 2d 368, 610 P.2d 857 (1980).
184. See Fahn,93 Wash. 2d at 383-84, 610 P.2d at 865.

185. See id
186. 68 Wash. App. 826, 846 P.2d 571 (1993).
187. See id at 831, 846 P.2d at 574.
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2.

The ConstructionIs Consistent with LegislativeIntent

An interpretation of the Law Against Discrimination granting
independent contractors the right to bring a cause of action for violations
of their civil rights is entirely consistent with legislative intent. Although
the Law Against Discrimination does not expressly grant independent
contractors the right to bring a cause of action, it clearly prohibits
interpretations of the Act that would deny persons the right to protect
their civil rights through private civil action. 88 Accordingly, the
Commission's construction merely clarifies the Legislature's intent that
all persons, including independent contractors, may protect their civil
rights in court, and does not create any new protected right."8 9
The courts have upheld other constructions provided by the Human
Rights Commission that have sought to clarify the intent of the
Legislature. The Washington Supreme Court found that the Commission
was justified in concluding that the Legislature did not intend to restrict
"marital status" discrimination only to cases where an employer refuses
to hire a person because that person is married or unmarried. 9 ° The
Commission's definitions of what constitutes "age" and "handicap" for
the purposes of the Act also have been deferred to and relied upon on
various occasions by the courts. 9 ' The courts found in each of these
cases that the Human Rights Commission acted well within its delegated
powers and authority, even though its constructions went beyond what
had been expressly provided for in the Law Against Discrimination.
Similarly, a construction clarifying that independent contractors may
bring a cause of action to protect their civil rights is well within the
Commission's authority to interpret the Act.

188. See Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.020 (1996).
189. See supra note 140 (quoting Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-170(2) (1995)).
190. See Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash.
2d 62, 69, 586 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1978).
191. See, e.g., Doe v. Boeing Co., 121 Wash. 2d 8, 846 P.2d 531 (1993); Phillips v. City of
Seattle, 111 Wash. 2d 903, 766 P.2d 1099 (1989); Gross v. City of Lynnwood, 90 Wash. 2d 395,
583 P.2d 1197 (1978); Kimmel v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 23 Wash. App. 78, 596 P.2d 1069
(1979); Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 22 Wash. App. 576,591 P.2d 461 (1979).
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The Marquis Court'sDeference to the Commission's Construction
Both Preserves the InterpretiveAuthority of the Commission and
Furthersthe Purposes of the Act

By interpreting the Law Against Discrimination to grant independent
contractors the ability to enforce their civil rights through private civil
actions, the Marquis court recognized the crucial role the Human Rights
Commission plays in administering and enforcing the Act. The
Legislature clearly intended the Commission to address those
discriminatory practices that could not have been anticipated by the
Legislature but nevertheless came within the scope of the Act.' 92 Thus,
the Legislature granted the Commission broad discretion and
responsibility to interpret legislative intent and administer the Act.193
Further, the Human Rights Commission has been acting in this capacity
for nearly fifty years and thus has acquired substantial administrative
expertise, giving it a comparative interpretive advantage. 94 By giving
great weight to the construction of the Law Against Discrimination at
issue in Marquis, the court preserved the Commission's interpretive
authority and insured the continued level of agency diligence and
expertise necessary for the proper administration of the Act.
Deference to the Human Rights Commission's construction of the
Law Against Discrimination at issue in Marquisalso was proper because
the construction furthers the intent of the Legislature. When interpreting
ambiguous statutory provisions, courts should adopt the interpretation
that best advances legislative intent. 9 ' The Commission expressly
acknowledged that although discrimination against independent
contractors is not an unfair practice, and thus not subject to its
jurisdiction, independent contractors are still entitled to the protection of
the general civil right to be free from discrimination.'9 6 The court
agreed, and therefore correctly found that independent contractors must
be allowed to bring a cause of action for violations of their civil rights.
An interpretation that would deny independent contractors the right to
sue, and thus the right to protect their civil rights at all, would be
192. See Washington Water Power Co., 91 Wash. 2d at 69,586 P.2d at 1153.
193. See Barnes, 22 Wash. App. at 581, 591 P.2d at 464.
194. See Asimow, supra note 29, at 1204 ("A court may be limited to conventional tools of

statutory interpretation, such as the use of dictionaries or ancient canons of construction, but an
agency may be more competent to reach an interpretation that reflects legislative intent, furthers
the statutory policy, and facilitates enforcement and administration."); see also Diver, supra note
170, at 578, 589.
195. See Hart v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d 197, 203, 888 P.2d 204, 208 (1978).
196. See text of Wash. Admin. Code § 162-16-170(2) (1995), supra note 14C.
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contrary to legislative intent. Thus, by adopting the Human Rights
Commission's construction of the Act, the court chose the interpretation
that best fulfilled legislative intent.
C.

ImproperApplication of the EstablishedRules ofJudicial
Deference Leads to UndesirableResults

Unlike the approach followed by the court in Marquis, the Griffin
court's approach to judicial deference illustrates the problems that arise
when courts fail to apply properly the established rules of judicial
deference. One such problem is that an agency's authority to engage in
statutory interpretation, and thus its ability to administer effectively the
statute for which it is responsible, is diminished. This is particularly true
when the Legislature has established a broad remedial statute and has
created an agency with wide discretion and responsibility to administer
that statute. The purpose of the rules of judicial deference is to preserve
both the ability of administrative agencies to construe ambiguous
statutory language, and thus their ability to implement that language, and
the authority of the courts to determine what the law is.'97 This delicate
balance of interpretive authority is threatened, however, every time the
courts, as happened in Griffin, fail to apply these rules properly.
Improper application of the established rules of judicial deference
also results in incorrect and inconsistent interpretations. Because an
agency often has a comparative interpretive advantage, courts may adopt
absurd, unlikely, or strained interpretations if they do not give proper
deference to the agency's construction. Such interpretations in general
both contradict the intent of the Legislature and frustrate the purpose of
the statute being interpreted. In addition, proper application of the
established rules of judicial deference encourages more consistent
interpretations. These rules, as with all rules of statutory interpretation,
are necessary to insure that the courts apply the law evenly and that
judicial discretion does not go unconstrained. Likewise, because the
courts still possess the ultimate authority to determine what the law is,
they can prevent administrative agencies from abusing their delegated
interpretive powers.

197. See Asimow, supra note 29, at 1159.
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CONCLUSION

The Washington Supreme Court has set a dangerous precedent for
future judicial review of administrative constructions of the Law Against
Discrimination by failing to apply consistently the established rules of
judicial deference. By focusing exclusively on the issue of
contemporaneity, the court in Griffin failed to acknowledge the Human
Rights Commission's broad delegation of rule-making and policyformulation powers and its expertise in administering the Act. The
Griffin court thus not only compromised the interpretive authority of the
Commission, but also misinterpreted the Act to deny persons working
for small employers any means with which to enforce their civil rights.
The court instead should continue to apply the established rules of
judicial deference, and it should decline to give substantial deference to
the Commission only when the Commission has clearly changed or
amended the meaning of the Law Against Discrimination beyond what
the Legislature has intended.

